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CONCLUSION
Following the ruling in the well-known Baby M case,1 which held
contracts for surrogate pregnancies void and unenforceable under
New Jersey Law,2 Jeremy Rifkin, co-chair for National Coalition
Against Surrogacy, predicted that “ ‘two years from now we will have
legislation’ banning surrogacy.” 3 Nearly twenty years later, Mr.
Rifkin’s prediction certainly has not come true. Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology (ART) has continued to develop in the United States;
although specific statistics are hard to come by, “about 1,600 babies
a year in the United States are born through gestational surrogacy
(which now accounts for almost all surrogacies), more than double the
number in 2004.”4 However, the legal frameworks affecting surrogacy
agreements are as varied as the people who enter into such contracts.
Pregnancy is a risky endeavor under any circumstances, but
medical technology has opened up new avenues through which people
1. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1231 (N.J. 1988), superceded by statute, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-46 (2016), as recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P. B., 736 A.2d 1277,
1284–85 (N.J. 1999).
2. Id. at 1234.
3. Janet Cawley, Surrogate Moms Fight the ‘Slavery,’ CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 1987),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-09-01/news/8703060344_1_surrogate-mothers
-surrogacy-arrangement-mary-beth-whitehead [http://perma.cc/FRL28RLS].
4. Anemona Hartocollis, And Surrogacy Makes 3, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/fashion/In-New-York-Some-Couples-Push-for-Legalization
-of-Compensated-Surrogacy.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SA39DL9L]; see also Magdalina
Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, 7 (2010), http://
www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJ0A1M.pdf.
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can use their own or donated genetic material to create their fami-
lies.5 Using a surrogate to carry a fetus to term involves a whole
host of additional hurdles for the hopeful parent(s). For many cou-
ples, surrogacy is a last-ditch attempt at what has been an emotion-
ally exhausting, disappointing process. No matter how the parent(s)
came to choose surrogacy, the financial cost is enormous,6 and the
medical procedures must be perfectly choreographed and executed.7
State legislatures have struggled to keep pace with medical ad-
vancements, and as a result, there is very little statutory consensus
as to a surrogate’s rights and obligations.8 Some states prohibit
surrogacy agreements as against public policy;9 others are much
more willing to enforce the agreements as long as they meet certain
statutory requirements.10 States also vary in the types of permissi-
ble surrogacy arrangements, which demonstrates that even within
the context of this single issue, different legislatures may still pri-
oritize different policy concerns. Central to all of the legal questions
prompted by surrogacy arrangements is the tension between the
surrogate’s bodily autonomy and the desires of the intended parents.
Most of the cases arising from surrogacy agreements have disputed
the resulting child’s parentage,11 or one party’s desire to terminate
5. Although outside the scope of this Note, it will be interesting to see whether certain
states’ approaches come under f ire in the near future in the light of rulings that expand
familial rights like Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). For example, FLA.
STAT. § 742.15(2) (LexisNexis 2015) requires a physician certify that the intended mother
is physically unable to bear children. Such a prerequisite seems unlikely to hold water
when validly married couples consisting of two men attempt to enlist a surrogate.
6. See Anticipated Costs for Gestational Surrogacy, CIRCLE SURROGACY, http://
www.circlesurrogacy.com/costs [http://perma.cc/9SAGSNS8] (estimating anywhere from
$100,000 to $150,000).
7. See Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. Of Ill., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008);
see also id.
8. See Alison Sherwood, Surrogacy Laws in the United States, MILWAUKEE WIS. J.
SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/health/163772546.html [http://
perma.cc/5SY8J9Z5].
9. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2016).
10. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.240–26.26.250 (LexisNexis 2016) (de-
claring any surrogacy contract for compensation void and unenforceable in the state of
Washington and classifying violation of related statutes as a gross misdemeanor), with
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.740(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (permitting surrogacy agreements
when the surrogate has undergone medical exam and has received independent legal con-
sultation about the contract’s terms). Interestingly, despite the myriad approaches, the
statutory root of many states’ assisted reproduction laws is some adaptation of the Uniform
Parentage Act. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. L. 2000).
11. This Note begins from the premise that the intended parent(s) are the legal parents
of the child. Some jurisdictions treat the surrogate as the legal parent of the resulting
child, and Part III of this Note argues in favor of intent as a basis for establishing legal
parentage. But for consistency’s sake, the woman who carries the fetus will be referred
to as the “surrogate” or “gestational carrier,” and the people who plan to parent that child
as the “intended parents.”
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the pregnancy, and as a result, much of the legislation addressing
surrogacy pertains to the aftermath following the child’s birth.12
Yet the process begins long before the birth. The intended
parent(s) often struggled with infertility for a substantial period of
time prior to choosing to enlist the help of a surrogate, and have
been immersed in an increasingly desperate pursuit of an expansion
of their family. The narrative is not rare: approximately six percent
of women ages fifteen to forty-four are unable to get pregnant after
one year of unprotected sex and twice as many women experience
impaired fecundity, or difficulty getting pregnant or carrying a preg-
nancy to term.13 The surrogates likewise have already undergone
medical evaluations to make sure they qualify as a potential match,
and considered for themselves what the establishment of this rela-
tionship will mean to them and their own families.14 The entire pro-
cess is fraught with hope as well as anxiety, and all of the parties
will feel the gravity of the endeavor.
This Note examines an as yet largely undefined scenario occur-
ring prior to the child’s birth. Surrogacy contracts typically contain
at least some provisions related to the surrogate’s expected behavior
during the pregnancy.15 I will analyze what causes of action may be
available to parents when the surrogate breaches one of those provi-
sions. Because of the overarching issues of personal autonomy and
the liberty interests of both the intended parent(s) and the surro-
gate, many courts have been reluctant to treat surrogacy agreements
the same as other contracts.16 Even in the context of commercial
contracts, specific performance, or a court requiring a party to fulfill
their end of the bargain as promised,17 is not a remedy available for
contracts of service.
Although not strictly speaking a commercial contract, a surro-
gacy agreement is a contract for a service, and I will argue specific
12. See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2011);
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal. 1993), superseded by statute as stated in
Catterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1127, 1237 (N.J. 1988),
superceded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46 (2016), as recognized in In re Adoption
of Children by G.P. B., 736 A.2d 1277, 1284–85 (N.J. 1999).
13. See Infertility FAQs, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION http://www.cdc.gov
/reproductivehealth/infertility/ [http://perma.cc/M6GLR5H7] (last updated Sept. 16, 2015).
14. See Anna Medaris Miller, What’s it Like to be a Surrogate Mom?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 6, 2016), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/health-wellness/arti
cles/2015/05/06/whats-it-like-to-be-a-surrogate-mom [http://perma.cc/FQB7FHUF].
15. See, e.g., Surrogacy Contract Sample, NPR (July 2015), http://media.npr.org/docu
ments/2015/july/Surrogacy_contract_sample_070215.pdf (requiring, for example, that
the surrogate begin taking prenatal vitamins and follow a doctor’s diet and caffeine con-
sumption recommendations).
16. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1247.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16, topic 3, Intr. Note (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
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performance should be available as an equitable remedy in a very
narrow set of circumstances. Namely, specific performance should
be available to intended parent(s) when the surrogate violates an
express provision of the contract pertaining to her behavior during
the pregnancy, so long as she still intends to carry the fetus to term.
This preserves her right to terminate the pregnancy, which has been
upheld in multiple jurisdictions, and also protects all parties’ rights
to enter into a voluntary contract with legal effect. Given the finan-
cial and emotional investment required of the intended parents,
specific performance provides the intended parents with an equita-
ble remedy for a violation of the trust they placed in the surrogate.
This Note will progress as follows: Part I summarizes the devel-
opment of surrogacy within both medical and social contexts, with
an overview of the current status of surrogacy laws in the United
States. Part II argues in favor of legal acknowledgment and enforce-
ment of surrogacy contracts. Part III explains why surrogacy agree-
ments should not be analyzed under family law. Part IV explores
the fetus’ legal role and how a suit against it could be supported,
and Part V settles upon specific performance as a viable equitable
remedy in response to the surrogate’s violation of behavioral provi-
sions in a surrogacy contract. Subject to an assortment of exclusions
and parameters, specific performance could provide redress to in-
tended parents when other causes of action might be impractical or
pose too high an evidentiary burden. Whether the surrogacy is tra-
ditional or gestational,18 that consideration should not affect the out-
come of such a dispute because the surrogate never intended to act as
a parent to the resulting child regardless of whether she contributed
genetic material.
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE LAWS
A. History
The practice of surrogacy reaches as far back as Genesis, when
Abram’s wife Sarai instructed him “Go, sleep with my maidservant
18. A “traditional” surrogate uses the ova of the woman carrying the pregnancy, while
a “gestational” surrogate, which only became medically possible after the development
of in vitro fertilization (fertilization of gametes in a laboratory), combines gametes from
either the intended parent(s) or a donor and implants the fertilized egg into the surrogate’s
uterus. In Vitro Fertilization, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH: U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MEDICINE,
MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007279.htm [http://perma.cc/6FLHA
UXK] (last updated Mar. 11, 2014). The difference is that a traditional surrogate is genet-
ically related to the resulting child, but a gestational surrogate is not.
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[Hagar]; perhaps I can build a family through her.”19 Similarly,
Rachel told Jacob to sleep with her servant, Bilbah, “so that she can
bear children for me and that through her I too can build a family.”20
Refusing to be outdone by her sister, Leah also relied on her servant,
Zilpah,21 and, all told, four of Jacob’s twelve immediate descendants
were born via surrogate.22 These family trees highlight three note-
worthy points. First, surrogacy is not at all a new idea. Although in
vitro fertilization (IVF) was first successfully executed in 1978,23
ultimately enabling gestational surrogacy, the concept and practice
of having another woman carry a baby for a married couple has
been going on for centuries. Second, the Old Testament wives were
the instigators of the surrogacies. Despite their lack of genetic con-
sanguinity, the wives saw surrogacy as a legitimate way to create her
own family; none of Jacob’s sons were considered bastards or other-
wise illegitimate.24 Third, the servants’ lack of consent to this ar-
rangement exemplifies concerns still held today about exploitation
of economically vulnerable women. These concerns are not entirely
unfounded, but modern surrogacy occurs in a context of de jure equal-
ity, and accompanying social norms provide further protection of the
surrogates’ rights. On slave plantations in the United States, plan-
tation masters commonly impregnated female slaves.25 In such
cases, the objective was much more insidious than the Old Testament
wives’ desire to improve their familial status by producing sons. The
plantation owners created a self-regenerating labor force, focused
entirely on property, not progeny.26
But the strong currents driving medical technology forward make
surrogacy an inevitable part of our society now and in the future,
and the law would better serve the potentially vulnerable partici-
pants’ interests by acknowledging its presence, increasing relevance,
and regulating accordingly. In turning a blind eye to surrogacy by
refusing to enforce even the most carefully crafted, equitable con-
tracts, courts and legislatures will fall even further behind on adapting
the law to current medical realities.
19. Genesis 16:2 (NIV) (emphasis added).
20. Genesis 30:3 (NIV).
21. Genesis 30:9 (NIV).
22. See Genesis 30 (NIV).
23. Adam Eley, How has IVF Developed Since the First “Test-Tube Baby,” BBC
HEALTH NEWS (July 23, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-33599353 [http://perma
.cc/5YY9RKSH].
24. See Genesis 30:26 (NIV).
25. Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97, 97 (2010).
26. See id.
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B. Current Approaches
Surrogacy is a prime example of states serving as “laborator[ies]”
for “social and economic experiments.”27 Individual states may design
their own surrogacy policies; the approaches are so varied there is
no clean-cut circuit split or majority-minority divide. Several states
have expressly declared surrogacy contracts void as against public
policy.28 The reasons states void surrogacy agreements tend to arise
out of concern about commodifying the surrogate or commodifying
the resultant baby.29
The argument in favor of “traditional” family construction still
bleeds into legal decisions about surrogacy. When New Jersey gover-
nor Chris Christie vetoed the New Jersey Gestational Carrier
Agreement Act in 2012, he said “[p]ermitting adults to contract with
others regarding a child in such a manner unquestionably raises
serious and significant issues,” and that the ethical considerations
were not conclusively researched to his satisfaction.30 He vetoed the
act again when the New Jersey Legislature sent it to him in June
2015.31 The veto came just days after the decision legalizing same-
sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges.32 Because same-sex couples obvi-
ously cannot produce a child of their own, it will be interesting to
see how LGBT activists attack the veto.
Meanwhile in Louisiana, even after making linguistic compro-
mises with anti-abortion groups, backers of a bill legalizing and
regulating surrogacy received a veto from Bobby Jindal in May
2014.33 As with Governor Christie, this was the second veto of a
proposed surrogacy law from Governor Jindal.34 Supposedly, “[t]he
lack of confidence in the bill’s ability to prevent ‘renting’ of bodies
27. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. See U.S. Surrogacy Law by State, THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE (2016) http://www
.thesurrogacyexperience.com/surrogate-mothers/the-law/u-s-surrogacy-law-by-state
[http://perma.cc/8VEN2XCJ].
29. See, e.g., Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Mother-
hood and the Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable
Contracts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 91, 96–97 (2009).
30. Michael Booth, Christie Vetoes Surrogacy Contract Bill, N.J. L.J. 1, 1 (June 30,
2015).
31. Id.
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
33. See Emily Lane, Bobby Jindal Again Vetoes Bill Allowing For Legal Surrogacy
Births in Louisiana, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 31, 2014, http://www
.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/bobby_jindal_again_vetoes_bill.html [http://perma
.cc/TXR5MQX8].
34. See id.
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was a deal breaker” that offended anti-abortion activists.35 Some
believe more generally that prospective parents should inherently
favor adoption over assisted reproduction because so many children
already in need of a stable home are lost within the foster care
system.36 But this condescending rhetoric denies infertile couples,
same-sex couples, and unmarried people a medically possible means
of building their families how they choose; it reduces these people’s
family creation ability to their own biological limits.
The wide variance exists even among the states that do accept
surrogacy contracts. For example, Illinois does not permit “adopted
embryos,” meaning at least one of the intended parents must con-
tribute a gamete; the resulting child will then be genetically related to
at least one of the intended parents.37 Meanwhile, Utah prohibits “tra-
ditional” surrogacy by excluding pregnancies using the surrogate’s
ova from the definition of authorized “gestational agreements.” 38
Virginia presents two options for surrogacy arrangements: one
in which the parties petition the court for approval of their contract,39
and one in which the court does not approve the contract ahead of
time.40 The obligations of the parties change somewhat depending
on the route they chose to take.41 A court-approved surrogacy con-
tract involves a home visit, an appointed guardian ad litem to rep-
resent the child, and counsel for the surrogate.42
Jurisdictions with statutory schemes on surrogacy frequently
require reimbursement for the surrogate’s medical care and other
expenses incident to the pregnancy,43 and states like Washington
prohibit additional payment.44 In effect, Washington and similar
states have chosen to permit “altruistic” but not “commercial” surro-
gacy. As the names imply, the “altruistic” surrogate receives no fi-
nancial compensation for the pregnancy, while a “commercial”
surrogate, though she may also have pure, intrinsic motivations,
35. Id.
36. See Elizabeth Eaves, Opinion, Not the Handmaid’s Tale, Forbes, Dec. 19, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/18/kuczynski-surrogacy-motherhood-oped-cx_ee
_1219eaves.html [http://perma.cc/UCM8GSRP] (describing responses to Alex Kuczynski’s
story of using a surrogate; original story is Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30Surrogate
-t.html [http://perma.cc/KC8NYDZL]).
37. Nancy Ford, The New Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 93 ILL. B.J. 240, 245
(2005).
38. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(7) (LexisNexis 2015).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A) (2015).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(B) (2015).
41. Id.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A) (2015).
43. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(5) (2015).
44. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (LexisNexis 2016).
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receives payment for carrying the child.45 States subscribing to that
distinction do so in an effort to dodge worries about exchanging
money for babies or incentivizing women to sell (or perhaps a better
term is “lease”) their bodies.46
As the market for surrogate pregnancies has grown, facilitators
of the process have also developed their own internal regulations to
protect parties’ interests. Possibly because the primary arbiters are
medical and legal professionals, self-imposed ethical standards are
rapidly emerging. The American Medical Association notes the po-
tential ethical issues head on in the AMA Code of Medical Ethics:
“Surrogate motherhood may commodify children and women’s repro-
ductive capacities, exploit poor women whose decision to participate
may not be wholly voluntary, and improperly discourage or interfere
with the formation of a natural maternal-fetal or maternal-child
bond.” 47 However, “most surrogacy arrangements are believed by
the parties involved to be mutually beneficial, and most are com-
pleted without mishap or dispute.” 48
The American Academy of Assisted Reproductive Technology
Attorneys has its own ethical code for representation, covering such
topics as conflicts of interest, legal fees, and the scope of representa-
tion.49 Their directory provides contact information for well over a hun-
dred attorneys across the country,50 indicating that this field is quickly
expanding, and that professionals are collaborating on establishing
norms and standards in spite of the non-uniform legal frameworks.
At the federal level, Congress began requiring fertility clinics
to report their success rates beginning in 1992.51 The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention now has fairly comprehensive data
about different assisted reproduction methods for each year, although
the usual difficulties of monitoring people’s reproductive choices
still somewhat limits the research results.52
45. Surrogacy, FERTILITY CONNECTIONS, http://www.fertilityconnections.com.au/surro
gacy [http://perma.cc/PP62GDXG].
46. See Surrogacy: Wombs for Rent?, NOW: ON PBS (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.pbs
.org/now/shows/538 [http://perma.cc/RUC2ESGE].
47. AM. MED. ASSOC., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCI-
ATION 2.18 (2010).
48. Id.
49. AM. ACAD. OF ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. ATT’YS, AAARTA ETHICS CODE, http://www
.aaarta.org/aaarta/academy-info/ethics-code [http://perma.cc/LY97ZDPB].
50. Find an Attorney, AM. ACAD. OF ASSISTED REPRO. TECH. ATT’YS, http://www.aaa
rta.org/aaarta_directory (searchable by map or name) [http://perma.cc/B55383RB].
51. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
106 Stat. 3146 (1992).
52. See 2013 ART Fertility Success Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 1, 1 (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/index.html [http://perma.cc/3LT3CL2R].
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II. SURROGACY CONTRACTS SHOULD BE LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
Surrogacy contracts inhabit a unique intersection of family,
contract, and property law. But these different legal areas do not
necessarily cohabit seamlessly. For example, contractual agreements
are a core feature of marriage, and can give rise to lifetime liability for
spousal support.53 Historically, marriage was, in essence, a property-
based transaction: “marriage was an arrangement of property for
the propertied.” 54 And of course, common law places high value on
the transfer of property downward through familial generations,
most generally through patriarchal inheritance and devises.55 Chil-
dren “were the conduits for family wealth.” 56 Thus, reproductive
capacity is inextricably linked to familial structure, but in many ways
the history of laws affecting families abut modern notions of what
family means, both in structure and in motive.57 As one commenta-
tor points out, “[t]he trend towards independence and self-suffi-
ciency for women . . . has made clear . . . that traditional marriage
is not well-adapted to dual-career couples.” 58
This tension between law and social norms also appears in the
surrogacy context. Despite the longstanding economic underpinnings
of marriage, many courts are extremely wary of adding any commer-
cial element to producing children.59 Indeed, that fear of commer-
cialization is the primary policy basis for courts to void surrogacy
contracts.60 This overt disavowal of “baby-selling” or any indicia of
commodifying the reproductive process leads to the conclusion that
surrogacy contracts are entirely classifiable as contracts for per-
sonal service, despite the literal “production” of a human being. The
53. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST.
L. 2015), although the trend in many jurisdiction tends to favor temporary, or rehabili-
tative, spousal maintenance. Contra id.
54. Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-
Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346, 350 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., the Married Women’s Property Acts, adopted by numerous states in the
mid nineteenth century, in light of the fact that in 2014, women comprised 46.8% of the
U.S. workforce; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1167–69 (1880); PA. ACT 21 MAR. 1841 § 3. P.L. 106; PA.
ACT 11 APR. 1848, §§ 1–6. P.L. 536; PA. ACT 9 APR. 1849, §§ 10–12. P.L. 526; PA. ACT 25
APR. 1850, § 37. P.L. 575; PA. ACT 11 APR. 1858, § 1. P.L. 315. DEP’T. OF LABOR, CHART:
LABOR FORCE BY SEX, 2014 AND PROJECTED 2022, http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/latest_an
nual_data.htm [http://perma.cc/DBA6FBBC].
58. Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2090 (2000).
59. See Hon. Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts
of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 21, 28 (1989).
60. See id.
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classification matters for determining the types of remedies usually
available in the event of a breach, but surrogacy involves such a
unique set of interests, certain small deviations from those norms
may be appropriate.
Enforcing surrogacy agreements in general preserves central
tenets of contract law. By intervening either to declare a contract
void for public policy or to eliminate particular provisions, courts
place an undue value judgment on the parties, restricting the par-
ties’ freedom to enter into voluntary agreements. In the context of
women’s reproductive choice, voiding surrogacy contracts “reinforce
the anti-feminist stereotype summed up in the slogan, ‘biology is
destiny.’ ” 61 In addition, the quality or equity of the bargain is out-
side the court’s purview,62 absent fraud, duress, or unconscionability.
As an ancillary recommendation, all parties to a surrogacy contract
should be entitled to independent legal counsel.63 The presence of
attorneys levels the playing field between parties of potentially
disparate levels of legal sophistication and insulates against poten-
tial future allegations of procedural unconscionability.64
Substantial rhetoric exists arguing that surrogacy takes advan-
tage of economically vulnerable women; although worthy of consider-
ation, this concern has likely been exaggerated.65 A study conducted
in 1994 found the average family income of surrogates was several
thousand dollars above the national median.66 This held true for both
unmarried and married surrogates, respectively,67 so there does not
appear to be a disproportionate effect on single women, a statisti-
cally more economically vulnerable population in general.68
Economic interests of all parties, including the surrogacy agen-
cies that match surrogates and intended parents, present some safe-
guards against taking advantage of financially vulnerable women.
To reiterate the importance of organizations like AAARTA, “[a]lthough
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Petroleum Refractionating Corp. v. Kendrick Oil Co., 65 F.2d 997,
998–99 (10th Cir. 1933).
63. Some jurisdictions do require legal counsel for all parties. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-160 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.740 (LexisNexis 2015).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
65. See Posner, supra 59, at 25 (“Interviews with surrogate mothers indicate not only
that they are not poor . . . [w]hen asked what they plan to do with the [compensation
they receive from intended parents], they give standard middle class answers.”).
66. See HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 54–55
(1994).
67. See id.
68. See Alexandra Cawthorne, The Straight Facts on Women in Poverty, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Oct. 2008), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/report
/2008/10/08/5103/the-straight-facts-on-women-in-poverty [http://perma.cc/R2QRTXU2].
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the absence of price discrimination is in part grounded in law, it is
primarily a result of self-regulation by the fertility industry.” 69
Many surrogacy agencies will not accept surrogates who use govern-
mental assistance like welfare and Section 8 housing.70 Even when
the surrogate receives additional compensation, surrogacy is not as
lucrative as critics make it out to be. Different payment schedules
obviously would beget different pay rates, and a true assessment of
the money earned would also consider the intensity of the individual
surrogate’s literal and figurative labor, but even generous estimates
will garner well below minimum wage.71 For international surro-
gacies where the exchange rate strongly favors the United States,72
there may be more room for an economic argument, but states could
easily regulate compensation policies for surrogacies within their
own borders. Although “[a]buses in surrogacy likely exist . . . the
characterizations of tangible harm to surrogate mothers do not com-
port with the empirical evidence.” 73
Treating surrogacy agreements through an exclusively contract
law approach would confine disputes to the people who actually
signed the agreement, rather than opening a cause of action for the
as-yet-unborn fetus. Only parties to a contract have standing to
recover for a breach. In a surrogacy arrangement, the intended par-
ent(s), the surrogate, and the surrogate’s spouse or partner, if she
has one,74 are the relevant parties. A fertility clinic or other medical
professionals may also be involved in the contracting process, but
they play only a minimal role in the potential causes of action
69. Peter Nicholas, Symposium Essay: Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional
Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on
Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2014).
70. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions for Surrogates, CIRCLE SURROGACY, http://
www.circlesurrogacy.com/surrogates/surrogates-requirements-faqs [http://perma.cc/4R
ED25EG]; Surrogacy Requirements, CONCEIVABILITIES, https://www.conceiveabilities
.com/surrogates/surrogate-requirements [http://perma.cc/H9WX6XEX]. It is not clear
whether these agency-level policies were a response to criticisms about low-income surro-
gates. Circle Surrogacy explains that the requirement intends to protect surrogates from
becoming ineligible for services as a result of payments they receive from the intended
parent(s). Regardless of the true rationale, surrogacy does not appear to be a viable means
of gaming the government aid system or achieving so-called “welfare queen” status.
71. See Elizabeth Eaves, Want to Work for $3 an hour? Try Surrogate Motherhood,
FORBES MAG., (July 24, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/23/surrogate-motherhood
-minimum-wage-opinions-columnists-elisabeth-eaves.html [http://perma.cc/DVZ8R3ZA].
72. Id. (noting that in India, for example, a $20,000 payment would be wildly above
market; well-paid surrogates there are more likely to receive closer to the equivalent of
$6,000).
73. Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the Empirical and the Norma-
tive, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 555, 560 (2013).
74. For obvious reasons, the surrogate is usually required by the contract to forgo sexual
intercourse with male partners during the relevant ovulation and fertilization time periods.
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described here.75 Arguably, the fetus could be considered a third-
party beneficiary of the contract.76 A third-party beneficiary is not
a party to the contract but is a person who has standing to bring
suit and enforce the contract because he stands to benefit from the
contract’s performance.77 However, this opens up all the questions
raised with fetal causes of action in general.78 It would present a
conundrum in light of the fact that the surrogate retains the right
to terminate the pregnancy; her choice to do so would not only
eliminate the third party’s benefits, it would extinguish the third
party from physical existence.
III. FAMILY LAW SHOULD NOT GOVERN SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Some commentators have argued that family law is the best
framework to address the legal issues surrogacy presents,79 but the
relationship between the parties does not align with the reasoning
behind certain family law doctrines, particularly during the preg-
nancy. Although surrogacy pertains to the creation of a family, the
parties to a surrogacy contract such as the surrogate and the in-
tended parent(s), are not forming a family. Rather, the intended
parents are forming their own family; the surrogate merely enables
or facilitates that endeavor.
A. Best Interest of the Child
The best interest of the child standard is inappropriate for dis-
putes arising during pregnancy because the fetus is not yet born and
because the surrogate is not serving a purely parental purpose. Spe-
cific elements of a child’s best interest vary by jurisdiction, but they
often include such factors as the child’s health and age, his or her
relationship with each parent, and the parents’ ability to provide
and care for the child.80 Many of these factors cannot reasonably
75. However, many surrogacy contracts do instruct the surrogate to follow the in-
structions of medical professionals consulted during the course of the pregnancy. See,
e.g., Sample GS Contract, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY, http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com
/sample_contracts/GScontract1.htm [http://perma.cc/H5KMN6B9].
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
77. Id.
78. Fetal causes of action are discussed in more depth infra Part IV.
79. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799 (Cal. 1993), superceded by statute
as stated in Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012), (Kennard, J., dissenting); A.
M. CAPRON & M. J. RADIN, CHOOSING FAMILY LAW OVER CONTRACT LAW AS A PARADIGM
FOR SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, reprinted in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND
PRIVACY 59–76 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
80. See Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 402 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970).
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apply to a child too young to have formed a real bond to any adult
serving a parental role. The best interest of the child standard most
often takes affect in disputes between two parents in the divorce
and custody context.81 Unless one parent is proven unfit, or in cases
involving “extraordinary circumstances,” both parents are presumed
to love their child and care about their child’s well-being with equal
force.82 Even though custody determinations occur within state
courts, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the Constitu-
tion protecting their freedom to procreate and raise their children
how they choose.83 By contrast, third parties who want custody of a
child do not have the same protections.84 Thus, even though an
action against a surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy is not a
dispute about parentage, identifying the parent(s) sets the starting
point for the analysis.85 If the surrogate is a parent, she has more
latitude to make decisions for the resulting child. Conversely, if she
is not a parent, then the intended parent(s) should receive greater
deference, even to the exclusion of the surrogate’s desires.
The seminal case of Baby M applied the best interest of the
child standard to determine the child’s custody because the New
Jersey Supreme Court found surrogacy contracts unenforceable for
public policy reasons.86 The court held that Mary Beth Whitehead,
the surrogate in that case, was the natural mother of the child.87
The surrogacy contract itself assumed her parentage by providing
clauses for the termination of such rights, but because the court
held the contract unenforceable, it also would not permit Whitehead
to elect to terminate her parental rights outside the context of a
child welfare agency.88
The California Supreme Court also dealt with the Uniform
Parentage Act in Johnson v. Calvert but came to a different result.89
The case involved gestational surrogacy so unlike Whitehead, surro-
gate Anna Johnson was not genetically related to the child she
81. Id.
82. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154 (Iowa 1966).
83. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’ty of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
84. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005); see also Unif. Marriage
and Divorce Act § 401(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799 (Cal. 1993), superceded by statute
as stated in Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012), (Kennard, J., dissenting).
86. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1261 (N.J. 1988), superceded by statute, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-46 (2016), as recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d
1277, 1284–85 (N.J. 1999).
87. Id. at 1234.
88. Id. at 1242.
89. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
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carried.90 However, under Johnson’s intent approach, no distinction
need be made for traditional and gestational surrogates because
parentage turns on who entered the agreement intending to raise
the child.91 Because the Uniform Parentage Act provided that birth
or genetic testing may each establish maternity,92 the California
Supreme Court used the intent of the parties to find in favor of the
intended parents over the surrogate.93
B. Intent-Based Parentage
Intent as a prerequisite for a parent-child relationship also
comes into play when determining paternity. The biological connec-
tion a man has with his child born out of wedlock gives him an
“opportunity . . . to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility
for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship . . . .” 94 Same-sex couples are also inherently affected
by intent to become parents, because whether or not one partner
contributes a gamete, the other will necessarily have no genetic
relation to the child. Couples consisting of two women can more
closely emulate “traditional” pregnancy than those consisting of two
men, however, by fertilizing ova of one partner and implanting it
into the other. The importance of adequate representation and in-
formation exchange during the contracting process is highlighted by
K.M. v. E.G., where one partner nearly lost custody of a child she
created with her egg and her partner’s womb because she signed an
agreement that by its terms waived her right to legal parentage.95
The appellate court ultimately restored parental rights of the part-
ner who contributed the egg.96 Extrinsic evidence in the women’s
living situation supported the claim that they intended to raise the
child together, but the trial court attempted to analogize the woman
whose egg was used to a sperm donor, who would be presumed not
to have parental rights.97 The court in K.M. did try to limit the
Johnson intent test to the issue presented in that particular case:
90. Id.
91. Id. at 782.
92. Unif. Parentage Act § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
93. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
94. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
95. K.M. v E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 682 (Cal. 2005).
96. Id.
97. Id. Note that the K.M. court distinguished the case from Johnson because rather
than determining which woman was the child’s mother, the court held that both women
could be the child’s mothers. Id. at 681.
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“[W]hether there is evidence of a parent and child relationship under
the UPA does not depend on the intent of the parent. For example,
a man who engages in sexual intercourse . . . is the father of a re-
sulting child, despite his lack of intent to become a father.” 98 While
true that intent is not a necessary condition to incur parental obliga-
tions, it should be sufficient. The intent to become a parent should be
marked at the time the parties enter into the surrogacy agreement.
As one commentator argued for the less invasive procedure of artifi-
cial insemination, states “should take the approach of allowing the
parties’ preconception intent to govern paternity.” 99
Statutory ambiguity can elicit creative arguments toward recog-
nition of intent-based parentage. The appellants in In re Roberto d.
B. wanted the gestational surrogate’s name removed from the result-
ing child’s birth certificate.100 Nobody disputed that the surrogate
did not intend to be the child’s mother, and she was not genetically
related to the child.101 The appellants argued that Maryland’s pater-
nity statutes violated the state’s Equal Rights Amendment because
although there was a legally recognized process for establishing and
disputing paternity, no such option existed for a woman seeking to
dispute maternity.102 The court found for the appellants largely for
pragmatic reasons: the Maryland Department of Vital Records did
not take issue with modifying this protocol, and such a holding
reflected the intent of these parties as well as those entering into
future agreements, wherein the surrogate “had a reasonable expec-
tation that her role in the lives of these children would terminate
upon delivery of the children.”103
Pennsylvania may soon set a precedent within their case law
bolstering intent-based parentage in the high-profile custody dis-
pute between television personality Sherri Shepherd and her ex-
husband Lamar Sally. While they were still married, Shepherd and
Sally hired a gestational surrogate using a donor egg, but the couple
separated midway through the pregnancy.104 Shepherd was not
98. Id. at 682.
99. Lori B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies,
29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 190, 200 (1986).
100. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 118 (Md. 2007).
101. Id. It is possible that the court will encounter future disputes under similar facts
because all language within the holding refers to the surrogate’s intent and her lack of
genetic relationship, but the court’s rationales in f inding for the appellants imply that
a traditional surrogate would still receive the same outcome.
102. Id. at 119–20.
103. Id. at 117–18.
104. Emily Strohm & Diane Herbst, Inside Sherri Shepherd’s Surrogacy Ruling: What
Happens Next, PEOPLE MAG. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.people.com/article/sherri-shepherd
-legal-mother-surrogate-baby-lamar-sally [http://perma.cc/4E4U5DMV]. The results of
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genetically related to the child, was not present for his birth, and
fought to keep her name off his birth certificate.105 Nevertheless, the
trial court found her liable for $4,100 per month in child support106
as the child’s legal mother, a decision affirmed by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court on the reasoning that at the time Shepherd entered
the agreement, she intended to parent the resulting child.107 The
surrogate of course agreed to carry the child in reliance on the promise
that she would not incur the responsibilities of being the child’s legal
parent,108 and as the owner of the facility Shepherd and Sally used
pointed out, “ ‘Surrogates don’t want to feel that someone could want
a baby and then just back out. The surrogate is not the mother.’ ”109
Because the best interest standard generally seeks to resolve
custody and visitation arrangements, it would make little sense
under an intent-based parentage framework. Were we to analyze
the surrogacy arrangement through a very literal family law lens,
the surrogate obviously has sole physical custody of a fetus in utero,
but the intent-based parentage determination, à la Johnson, would
preclude her from having legal custody. Such a result is intuitively
bizarre; it is hard to imagine a court entrusting primary caretaking
responsibilities to a parent and simultaneously barring that parent
from making decisions about the child’s life.
Although those who favor a family law approach to surrogacy
might argue that enduring the pregnancy counts as accepting re-
sponsibility for the child’s future, the extent of the relationship be-
tween the surrogate and the child after birth can easily be delineated
in the terms of the contract. Some surrogates may want to visit with
the child after it is born, others may prefer just seeing photographs
and periodic updates on the child’s well-being, and still others may
be content with no further contact after the birth. Intended parents’
preferences could span an equally wide spectrum.110
the case are sealed, so the currently available information comes primarily from celebrity
news sources.
105. Emily Strohm, Lamar Sally Says Court Battle with Sherri Shepherd Over Surro-
gacy is ‘Heartbreaking,’ PEOPLE MAG.( Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.people.com/article/sherri
-shepherd-surrogacy-court-battle-lamar-sally-custody [http://perma.cc/LJ92L8VN].
106. Maryclaire Dale, Court Rules Sherri Shepherd Must Support Her Son Born to
Surrogate, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/tv/2015/11/24
/court-rules-sherri-shepherd-must-support-her-son-born-surrogate/76346498 [http://perma
.cc/K64N3485].
107. Strohm, supra note 105.
108. Id. Jessica Bartholomew, the surrogate, said “I’m just frustrated that I’m the
mother of the baby, but hopefully when we come back again all that will change.” Id.
109. Dale, supra note 106.
110. For Susan de Gruchy, discussed later in this section, geographic separation from
the surrogate was a top priority even during the pregnancy, but she later found that the
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One study of surrogate mothers’ experiences found primarily
harmonious relationships between surrogates and intended parents,
despite some variability in the level of contact before, during, and
after the pregnancy.111 Among surrogates previously known to the
intended parents, about half played some “special role” in the child’s
life; the others maintained their prior relationship to the family.112
As for surrogates who were previously strangers to the intended
parents, some played a “special role,” but approximately two-thirds
of those surveyed merely continued some smaller quantum of contact
with either the family or the parents exclusively.113 The divide between
contact with the whole family versus just the parents indicates that
even within the spectrum of people willing to continue a relation-
ship with the surrogate, some intended parents are more comfort-
able being the people in control of the scope of the relationship. Due
to the varying gradations of parties’ personal preferences and comfort
levels, providing for the post-birth relationship within the contract
will more reliably ensure a meeting of the minds on that front.
IV. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE SURROGATE
A. Fetal Cause of Action
Prior to the mid-20th century, many jurisdictions also adhered
to immunity doctrines for suits between parents and children so as
not to disrupt family harmony and unity by encouraging litigation
between family members.114 Most jurisdictions have since done away
with parental immunity doctrines,115 but a jurisdiction willing to
recognize a surrogacy contract would probably not apply the immu-
nity to the surrogate anyway because the nature of the agreement
is her forfeiture of presumed or genetic parental rights upon the
child’s birth.116
However, there is case law supporting recovery by a fetus for
prenatal injuries. Recovery for prenatal injuries due to a third party’s
negligence is most often available to parents when the fetus is at or
distance only increased her anxiety. Thus, she eventually began taking almost weekly
trips from Boston to Baltimore to visit her surrogate. Infra note 137.
111. Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers, 18 HUMAN
REPROD. 2196, 2199–200 (2003).
112. Id. at 2201.
113. Id.
114. See Lemmen v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341, 333–34 (Wis. 1968).
115. 78 A.L.R.4th 1082. See also Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 177 (1926), overruled
by Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972).
116. See, e.g., Unif. Parentage Act § 807 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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beyond the age of viability.117 Viability refers to the point of develop-
ment at which the fetus could survive outside of the womb, and can
occur as early as twenty-one weeks into the pregnancy, though each
child is different and the average is closer to twenty-four weeks.118
Roe v. Wade applied viability as the point at which the state’s inter-
est in protecting the potentiality of human life became so compelling
the state could legislate against abortions except in cases where the
mother’s life or health was in danger.119 Individual states have also
used viability as a line for the availability of prenatal tort recov-
ery.120 At the time of the surrogacy contract’s execution, the child-to-
be was either still two separate gametes or a laboratory-preserved
zygote, and thus not covered by any personhood definition that
would garner standing to sue in court.121
Cases in which a parent is held liable for their own child’s pre-
natal injury are rarer, probably in part because the person usually
suing on behalf of the fetus is the fetus’ other parent. As a practical
matter, a parent is already obligated to provide for their child’s
support,122 so an award of damages against a parent would be un-
likely to make a substantial difference in the child’s life. Some
courts have expressly rejected such a cause of action. In Stallman
v. Youngquist, a child born alive could not bring an action against
her mother when the child sustained injuries in a car accident while
in utero.123 Part of the reasoning derived from Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ analysis of Dietrich v. Northampton in 1884,124 that a fetus
could not have a cause of action against any third party because it
“was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, [and] any dam-
age to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was
117. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (2016) (permitting recovery for “fetal death,”
which, per VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-249(2) (2016) can occur “regardless of the duration of
pregnancy”).
118. What does Viable Pregnancy Mean?, BABYMED, http://www.babymed.com/prema
turity/pregnancy-viability-what-does-it-mean [http://perma.cc/23PGWYJZ].
119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
120. See, e.g., Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1265 (Md. 1995) (holding that there is
no cause of action for a nonviable fetus who was stillborn).
121. Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., S.C., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(f inding no cause of action under Illinois’s Wrongful Death Act for when an embryo was
negligently destroyed prior to uterine implantation).
122. Child support by noncustodial parents is among the few domestic law issues
governed at the federal, rather than the state level, partially to ensure jurisdiction over
parents living in different states. See Failure to pay legal child support obligations, 18
U.S.C.S. § 228 (2016); Requirement of statutorily prescribed procedures to improve
effectiveness of child support enforcement, 42 U.S.C.S. § 666 (2016) (requiring all states
adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act).
123. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 355 (Ill. 1988).
124. Deitrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 14 (1884).
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recoverable by her.”125 Some courts have since permitted a fetal cause
of action against a third party.126
As to the cause of action against the fetus’ mother, a Michigan
case Grodin v. Grodin offers a thought-provoking example.127 In
Grodin, the child was born with discolored teeth as a result of a
drug the mother took during the pregnancy.128 To reconcile the
mother’s role as a parent against her role as an independent adult,
the court asked whether her continuing to take the drugs was
“[reasonable] parental authority and discretion.”129 Although the
court remanded the case to determine the reasonableness of the
drug use, it added that:
[J]ustice requires . . . that a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body. If the wrongful conduct of another
interferes with that right, and it can be established by compe-
tent proof that there is a causal connection between the wrong-
ful interference and the harm suffered by the child when born,
damages for such harm should be recoverable by the child.130
This analysis could apply to a surrogacy case as well; the “parental”
role could be divined from, but also limited to, the biological role she
plays in the fetus’ development. As a matter of behavioral econom-
ics, the surrogate does not have quite as strong an interest in pro-
tecting the fetus, since her role ends when she gives the baby to the
intended parents. Especially for a commercial surrogate, rather
than a so-called altruistic surrogate, the relationship may well end
at the baby’s birth, so a standard of “reasonability” might be differ-
ent for her than for a pregnant woman who plans to raise the child
she is carrying.
B. Negligence
A claim by the intended parent(s) might find more success than
a claim brought by the fetus, but the evidentiary burdens of negli-
gence make a contract breach argument easier to prove. By deriving
the surrogate’s elevated standard of care from the terms of the
contract,131 we can alleviate some of the speculation about how the
125. Id. at 17; see also Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 356.
126. See Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995).
127. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396 (1980).
128. Id. at 397.
129. Id. at 399.
130. Id. at 870 (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 365 (1960).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
386 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:367
so-called reasonable person would have acted in similar circum-
stances. The language of Illinois’ Gestational Surrogate Act illus-
trates the inherent difficulty of imposing a bright-line rule for
pregnancy conduct.132 Illinois will presume the enforceability of a
surrogacy contract “even though” it contains the gestational surro-
gate’s agreement
to abstain from any activities that the intended parent or parents
or the physician reasonably believes to be harmful to the preg-
nancy and future health of the child, including, without limita-
tion, smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed drugs,
using prescription drugs not authorized by a physician aware of
the gestational surrogate’s pregnancy, exposure to radiation, or
any other activities proscribed by a health care provider . . .133
In this example, the legislature chose to enumerate some of the
more well-known pregnancy dangers, but did not attempt to create
a comprehensive or exclusive list. The presumption in favor of the
contract “even though” it contains such a provision serves as a nod
to the parties’ freedom to contract, but it does not require the par-
ties negotiate so thoroughly. To be sure, it would not be easy for the
intended parents to anticipate every possible contingency or habit
the surrogate might exhibit, but requiring a clause in the contract
addressing the parties’ behavioral expectations would aid the cre-
ation of more airtight contracts with a more thorough meeting of the
minds. Intended parents would be incentivized to plan ahead and
consider possible future conflicts, and if the surrogate does not agree
to the terms, the parties become aware at the outset that they will
not make a good match and can alter their plans accordingly.
Proscriptions against smoking, drinking alcohol, and using
drugs comprise the most obvious restrictions,134 but other recom-
mendations for optimal pregnancy practices are continually in flux
as more research emerges.135 Intended parents may also just want
132. GESTATIONAL SURROGATE ACT, 93-921 § 15 (Ill. Legis. Serv. 2004).
133. Id. § 10(d)(2).
134. See NAT. INST. OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUM. DEV., What Are the Factors That Put
Pregnancy at Risk?, (June 17, 2013), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/high-risk
/conditioninfo/Pages/factors.aspx#lifestyle [http://perma.cc/CXR7MKBB] ( listing only the
use of alcohol and cigarettes under the heading of “Lifestyle Factors” that could negatively
impact a pregnancy).
135. See, e.g., Katherine Kam, The Top 7 Pregnancy Myths, WEBMD, http://www.web
md.com/baby/guide/top-7-pregnancy-myths?page=2 [http://perma.cc/4AW9G74B] (reviewed
by Jennifer Robinson, MD, FACOG); Katharine K. McKnight, MD, Lifestyle Changes for
a Healthy Pregnancy: Caffeine, Exercise, and More, CONTEMPORARY OB/GYN (Apr. 1,
2013), http://contemporaryobgyn.modernmedicine.com/contemporary-obgyn/news/user
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to express certain lifestyle preferences; for example, a vegetarian
couple might find it very morally important whether their surrogate
eats meat while pregnant with their child. Dietary restrictions are
an example of the grayer area in pregnancy behavior, in that the
fetus probably will not be adversely affected by minor deviations in
the surrogate’s behavior, but intended parents are likely to want the
surrogate to adhere to conduct that minimizes risk. It is easy to
empathize with the intended parents’ desires: the path to the cre-
ation of their family was probably already filled with anticipation
dashed by disappointment, surrogacy is an extremely expensive
procedure, and their ability to have another child if the surrogacy
fails may be very limited or completely absent.136
Susan de Gruchy articulated these concerns when Whitney
Watts, the surrogate carrying de Gruchy’s twins, began experiencing
cervical complications midway through the pregnancy.137 Doctors
ordered Watts on bed rest for nearly two months, and the medical
uncertainty, combined with the distance between the parties, made
the ordeal emotionally difficult for de Gruchy. “ ‘Here I am in Boston
and I’m having to trust that she’s not going up and down stairs’ . . . ‘I
became a little consumed with that.’ ”138 This case has a happy
ending; Watts gave birth to the de Gruchys’ two boys,139 but the
nearly obsessive anxiety of the intended parent(s) follows naturally
from the financial and emotional turmoil the intended parent(s)
have already experienced in their attempts to have children.
C. Other Pregnancy Interventions
There is also some precedent for state intervention in the con-
duct of a pregnant woman. Wisconsin courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
an unborn child alleged to be in need of protection or services
which can be ordered by the court whose expectant mother habit-
ually lacks self-control in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled
-def ined-tags/pregnancy/science-based-answers-prenatal-lifestyle-questio?page=full
[http://perma.cc/YQZ94CZQ].
136. See Kuczynski, supra note 36. See also Staying Positive and Calm During an IVF
Cycle with a Gestational Surrogate, FERTILITY SOURCE COMPANIES, https://www.fertility
sourcecompanies.com/staying-positive-calm-ivf-cycle-with-gestational-surrogate [http://
perma.cc/AY9K8SL5].
137. Jennifer Ludden, Ties that Bind: When Surrogate Meets Mom-To-Be, NPR,
(Apr. 13, 2012 5:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/13/150563803/ties-that-bind-when
-surrogate-meets-mom-to-be [http://perma.cc/ABN92Y56].
138. Id.
139. Id.
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substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe
degree, to the extent that there is a substantial risk that the
physical health of the unborn child, and of the child when born,
will be seriously affected or endangered unless the expectant
mother receives prompt and adequate treatment for that habit-
ual lack of self-control. The court also has exclusive original juris-
diction over the expectant mother of an unborn child described
in this section.140
This statute grants Wisconsin fairly broad power to intervene in a
woman’s pregnancy when there are concerns about the use of con-
trolled substances.141 Since substance abuse often also carries crim-
inal liability, the state interest is readily apparent. The problem
presented by such statutes, however, is that they label the fetus
essentially as a victim of a crime or civil infraction before the fetus
has unequivocally obtained legal personhood.142 When the offender
against the fetus is a negligent third party, for example, allowing
recovery by the fetus seems fairly reasonable. In contrast, when the
health and autonomy of the mother (or the gestational carrier)
prompted the harmful result to the fetus, the state’s intervention
feels more intrusive. A surrogacy agreement occupies somewhat of
a middle ground between the two scenarios.
It is also important to distinguish this proposed cause of action
from “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” suits. Although these ac-
tions share some factual overlap with the hypothetical negligent
surrogate, “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” come from philosoph-
ically different roots. Wrongful birth lawsuits involve parents of a
disabled or diseased child suing their medical practitioners for
failing to warn them of the risk of the child’s disability while wrong-
ful life actions are brought by (or on behalf of) the disabled child.143
Courts may grant relief to the parents to compensate them for ad-
ditional medical and caretaking expenses,144 but these cases, and
particularly wrongful life cases, pose troubling public policy ques-
tions. Essentially, the plaintiff tries to prove that nonlife would have
140. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.133 (2015).
141. Despite this relatively zealous statutory protection of the fetus, Wisconsin law is
almost completely silent on the subject of surrogacy, not expressly outlawing or permit-
ting it, and only ruling on a couple of surrogacy cases. See In Interest of Angel Lace M. v.
Terry M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 678 (Wis. 1994); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 853 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1981).
142. See Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., S.C., 897 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008).
143. Deanna A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA.
L. REV. 327, 327 (2004).
144. See Rich v. Foye, 976 A.2d 819, 836 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
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been preferable to disabled life, and courts are hesitant to grant
relief on that reasoning.145 The arduous process of forming and
executing a surrogacy arrangement diminishes the chances of a suc-
cessful claim for wrongful life or birth because it would amount to
a radical switch in the intended parents’ demonstrated desire to
have a child no matter the cost. In addition, the implication in
wrongful birth is that the mother might have sought an abortion
had she known of the child’s abnormalities, but jurisdictions that
permit surrogacy reserve the right to abort the pregnancy exclu-
sively for the surrogate.146 A version of the wrongful life or birth
action that sues a surrogate rather than a doctor would likely not be
cognizable even in a jurisdiction that recognizes surrogacy contracts
or wrongful life actions.
V. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Contract law generally precludes specific performance as a
remedy when the contract was for personal service.147 But the com-
ments to the second Restatement describe the preclusion as an off-
shoot of the more general bar against ordering specific performance
when doing so would compel actions repugnant to public policy.148
A court of equity will not require specific performance, as a
matter of course. It will evaluate the conduct of the parties, the
circumstances and the equities of each particular case. It will
not use its discretion to grant the remedy unless its exercise will
subserve the ends of justice and the result of its assistance is
fair, just and reasonable.149
Interestingly, the Restatement does permit specific performance
when the breached contract duty was one of forbearance.150 The
kinds of disputes contemplated in this Note are just that: forbearing
alcohol, unhealthy food, or risky activities.
145. But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (recognizing a wrongful life cause of action but limiting the child’s recovery
to special damages).
146. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15(3)(a) (West 2016) (requiring a gestational surrogacy
contract contain a provision stating “[t]he commissioning couple agrees that the gestational
surrogate shall be the sole source of consent with respect to clinical intervention and
management of the pregnancy”) (emphasis added).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
148. Id. at cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 at cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1981).
149. Zouck v. Zouck, 104 A.2d 573, 577–78 (Md. 1954).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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The reasons for offering specific performance as a remedy in
certain other circumstances can also align with the policy interests
served in a surrogacy agreement. Specific performance may be
ordered when other remedies such as monetary damages, would be
inadequate, and when the good promised by the contract is unique.151
The uniqueness of the product is what renders the monetary dam-
ages insufficient; in an alternative scenario, the promisee may rela-
tively easily obtain a basic widget from another producer. Hence,
specific performance is most often employed for contracts for the
sale of land, because in spite of its omnipresence in legal hypotheticals,
there is only one Blackacre. Likewise, there is only one child that
could possibly result from a given embryo, and the emotional and
financial cost of attempting subsequent fertilizations and implanta-
tions is incredibly high.
Delaware has one of the more comprehensive statutory schemes
regarding gestational surrogacy.152 In the section on available reme-
dies for breach of the agreement, the legislature specifically ex-
cludes specific performance “for a breach by the gestational carrier
of a gestational carrier agreement term that requires her to be
impregnated.”153 However, that section also provides for “all reme-
dies available at law and equity” for either the surrogate or the
intended parent(s) depending on which party breached the agree-
ment.154 Delaware also accounts for the substantive provisions of the
contract; similar to Illinois, the contract will be enforceable even if
it includes agreement
[T]o abstain from any activities that the intended parent or par-
ents or the physician reasonably believes to be harmful to the
pregnancy and future health of the child, including, without limita-
tion, smoking, drinking alcohol, using nonprescribed drugs, using
prescription drugs not authorized by a physician aware of the
gestational carrier’s pregnancy, exposure to radiation, or any
other activities proscribed by a health care provider.155
The statute thus places primary weight on the opinion of the medical
practitioner supervising the pregnancy, which could act as a safe-
guard against unconscionable behavioral requests by the intended
parent(s). Combined with the requirement that the surrogate re-
ceive independent legal counsel prior to entering the contract,156
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
152. See DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 §§ 8-804–813 (West 2016).
153. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 8-810(c) (West 2016).
154. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 8-810(a–b) (West 2016).
155. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 8-807(d)(2) (West 2016).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13 § 8-806(a)(5) (West 2016).
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Delaware provides sufficient safeguards of the surrogate’s interest
to render the specific performance exclusion unnecessary.
Specific performance also provides redress for scenarios where,
as here, the requirements of negligence or other torts would be
difficult to meet. Evidentiary burdens would likely be the biggest
hurdle for the intended parents under a standard negligence allega-
tion. By contrast, a contract claim would not require the intended
parents show that the surrogate breached a duty she owed either to
the intended parents or potentially the fetus, that the fetus was
harmed, and that the surrogate’s conduct was the actual and proxi-
mate cause of the harm the fetus sustained. In essence, the specific
performance option addresses the principle of holding the surrogate
accountable for promises she made to the intended parents.
The rationale for not forcing a surrogate to continue a preg-
nancy she wishes to terminate are (hopefully) obvious: a require-
ment that a surrogate carry a pregnancy against her will would
flagrantly violate her bodily autonomy.157 These policy concerns are
wholly valid, and surrogacy contracts have adapted to deal with
potential disputes about total nonperformance. To the extent that
surrogacy contracts have acquired “boilerplate” language, the surro-
gate’s right to terminate the pregnancy even when there is no im-
minent danger to her health has become part of the standard
form,158 and she is generally not liable for terminating the agree-
ment prior to the embryo transfer.159
If narrowly construed, specific performance could be effectively
employed as a remedy for when the surrogate breaches a term of the
contract regarding her behavior during the pregnancy. This sug-
gested framework would only apply to events during the pregnancy,
to protect from overreach into the surrogate’s bodily autonomy. As
a threshold matter, specific performance should only be available
when the surrogate intends to bring the pregnancy to term. It would
also only extend to express terms within the surrogacy agreement,
so that neither the court nor the surrogate becomes legally obligated
to anticipate the unarticulated desires of the intended parents. By
so confining the reach of the liability, the parties will realize incen-
tives for careful and thorough drafting of their surrogacy contracts,
157. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Unif. Parentage Act § 801(f) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R
ON UNIF. ST. L. 2002) (reserving plenary power for the surrogate to make determinations
about her health).
158. See Surrogacy Contract Sample, supra note 15.
159. See, e.g., Unif. Parentage Act § 806(d) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. L.
2002).
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and clearly delineated terms put the surrogate in a better position
to give informed consent.
The classic case Hamer v. Sidway provides some useful analo-
gies.160 In Sidway, an uncle promised his nephew $5,000 for five
years abstention from drinking alcohol, smoking, and other activities
the uncle believed were immoral.161 Although the uncle died before
the five years had passed, the nephew was able to sue his estate and
claim the money he “earned” through his good behavior.162 Although
the main holding of that case was that forbearance can serve as suf-
ficient consideration to validate a contract, the likely motivations of
the parties are informative for surrogacy contract requirements. What
the uncle wanted from the nephew was his conduct; the nephew’s
lack of indulgence in any of those vices would not be life-threatening,
or even dangerous at all (quite the opposite). Similarly, intended par-
ents express a valid desire to exercise control over the fetus the way
they would if they were carrying the child themselves. The validity
of that desire is not altered by the fact that the conduct the surro-
gate wishes to engage in might not be immediately or quantifiably
harmful to the fetus.
Another analogy that may make this proposed remedy more
palatable is to that of a daycare provider. During the time a child
spends in a daycare facility, those in charge of that facility have sole
control over the child’s well-being, but that does not eliminate the
parents from the picture. If the parents want their child to eat non-
genetically modified snacks after naptime, they can provide alterna-
tive food for their own child, and could reasonably take issue with
the daycare providers for acting directly against the parents’ wishes.
So too, if the surrogate undertakes the pregnancy for a particular
family, she should abide by the reasonable and expressly delineated
desires of the intended parent(s).
Today’s courts also consistently support judicial discretion in
family dissolution matters like determining alimony and child cus-
tody.163 As described above in the discussion of family law, many state
statutes include a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in
these matters,164 and a judge does not necessarily need to explain
his or her precise rationale for the conclusion they reach. Specific
performance by its nature is an equitable remedy. A judge could
treat this variety of contract breach through a similar case-by-case
160. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 256 (N.Y. 1891).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See L.M.S. v. S.L.S. 312 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15(2) (West 2016).
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analysis, without necessarily treating the dispute as a domestic one,
despite the roles of the parties.
Restricting the use of specific performance to cases where (1) the
surrogate intends to bring the pregnancy to term and (2) her behav-
ior violates an express provision of the contract will not infringe upon
her physical autonomy because it is merely a temporary forbearance
and the fact finder has the discretion to deny a petition for specific
performance if it would be unduly burdensome on the surrogate. For
the kinds of scenarios this Note anticipates, however, specific per-
formance would most likely amount to an impermanent, relatively
minor lifestyle adjustment. Including this equitable remedy as an
option could afford the intended parents sufficient control over the
process of building their family, and it preserves the parties’ free-
dom to contract and to have those contracts legally acknowledged by
the courts when a dispute arises.
CONCLUSION
The future of surrogacy depends on the momentum of legal and
social acceptance. The myriad legal approaches among the states do
not offer an obvious direction, but it is hard to imagine that incon-
sistent legal treatment alone would halt or substantially stall the
progress of medical research. Legal treatment is inextricably en-
trenched in a community’s social values. Even as the demand for
assisted reproductive technology rises, there are sizeable popula-
tions of people vehemently opposed to surrogacy or any other inter-
ference with pregnancy. The backlash speaks to the inherently
emotional nature of pregnancy and the spiritual and moral implica-
tions bound up in reproduction.
Model Christine Teigen recently shared on Twitter that she and
husband John Legend were pregnant through in vitro fertilization
and that they had chosen to implant a female embryo, many of the
responses she received cast aspersions about her family and IVF in
general.165 After fielding so many negative responses Teigen tweeted,
“I [sic] think I [sic] made a mistake in thinking people understood
the process better than they do.”166
But the openness of public figures may work toward disman-
tling misinformation and stigma surrounding assisted reproduction.
165. See, e.g., Elizabeth Collin (@Baby_C_69), Twitter (Feb. 24, 2:17 PM), https://twitter
.com/chrissyteigen/status/702618297754263552 (“maybe you weren’t supposed to have
a kid since there is [sic] so many kids without parents”) [http://perma.cc/2FS236WL].
166. Christine Teigan (@chrissyteigan), Twitter, (Feb. 24 10:56 PM), https://twitter
.com/chrissyteigen/status/702749017734709248 [http://perma.cc/2FS236WL].
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At the very least, media depictions of nonnuclear families and families
utilizing assisted reproductive technologies initiates cultural dia-
logue about these issues. In the past decade, several well-known
movies featured plotlines involving assisted reproduction. “The Kids
Are Alright”167 and “Delivery Man”168 explored (with different ratios
of comedy to drama) the rights of sperm donors, and “Baby Mama”
featured Tina Fey and Amy Poehler in a scenario much like that
envisioned in this Note.169 Although the surrogate’s circumstances
in “Baby Mama” raise concerns about the voluntariness of her in-
volvement in the contract,170 films prompt viewers to imagine them-
selves in the place of the characters, and thus bring these reproductive
issues into the cultural consciousness.
In light of the legalization of same-sex marriage, surrogacy is
likely to become an even more prevalent way for people to build
their families. With more people seeking this procedure, courts are
likely to encounter more disputes raising as-yet unanswered legal
questions. Because many jurisdictions still have no statutory scheme
addressing surrogacy,171 courts are also in a position to color the law
so as to protect the interests of all parties to a surrogacy contract,
including the hopeful parents who put their trust and their genes in
the hands of their surrogate. When courts encounter disputes about
the surrogate’s behavior during the pregnancy, they should take
into account the import of the promise the surrogate made, and
consider specific performance as an equitable remedy for the in-
tended parents. However, as one commentator who built their
family through a surrogate points out,
these sorts of concerns only come into play when things go
wrong, and in the overwhelming majority of surrogacy arrange-
ments, everything goes smoothly, even in states where surrogacy
occurs in the shadows. Indeed, the absence of cases addressing
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts . . . is a sign that surro-
gacy arrangements in those states have thus far gone smoothly,
since it is typically only when disputes arise between surrogates
and intended parents that either appellate court decisions are
published or corrective legislation enacted.172
167. THE KIDS ARE ALL RIGHT (Focus Features 2010).
168. DELIVERY MAN (DreamWorks Pictures 2013).
169. BABY MAMA (Universal Pictures 2008).
170. Id.
171. See Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United States, CREATIVE FAMILY
CONNECTIONS, http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/#!surrogacy-law-by-state/f49jq
[http://perma.cc/5ZJDFVEA].
172. Nicholas, supra note 69, at 1247.
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Legislative schemes and remedial consequences for breaching
a surrogacy agreement will help incentivize fair dealing throughout
the process; surrogacy is not a zero-sum game. Much of what makes
surrogacy so legally fraught is also what makes it so often success-
ful: the emotional nature of the arrangement, the degree of sacrifice
and investment on both sides, and the fact that a new life may result
should also, in most cases, incentivize compassionate and coopera-
tive behavior by the people involved.
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